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Indo Russian Military Technical Cooperation
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In 1995, India ordered 150 MiG-21 BIS aircraft from Russia. This attack
aircraft is completely designed by Russia, and Indian input has not yet been
agreed on. Russia has recently delivered two of the prototypes to the HAL unit
in Bangalore where work on its upgrading and flight testing will commence soon.
Russia is to transfer the technology to the HAL unit where future
assembly/production is to take place.(19) Russia is designing the weaponry
onboard the MiG-21 BIS to Indian specifications, but the chaff dispensers that
the craft carries have been supplied by Israel.(20)
The two sides agreed in summer 1998 that India would receive the Russian
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT), also called the MiG-AT. This deal includes transfer
of technology, with production to commence in 1998. The negotiated price for
this trainer is almost 50 percent of that quoted for the British Hawk. The deal
is even more attractive because the IAF is badly in need of more AJTs. In the
current decade, accidents have increased dramatically because the IAF lacks
enough good training crafts. With pilots training to fly "fourth-generation"
aircraft, good-quality AJTs are particularly valuable.(21) The inertial guidance
system and the engine and ring laser gyros for the AJTs are being supplied by
France.
Work on upgrading India's fleet of MiG-27 aircraft has begun in earnest at HAL
units around the country. This upgradation will receive beneficial spinoffs from
the indigenous pool of research conducted for the light combat aircraft (LCA)
that India is building. This is particularly relevant in the electronics segment
(such as electronic warfare, signal jamming, communications, identification of
friend or foe). It is noteworthy that keeping the MiG-27 fleet at its fighting
best is a priority for the IAF, at least until all the Su-30s are delivered,
assembled, flight tested, and inducted into the force. The timeline before the
LCA can enter into service is even more extended.(22) Thus, the MiG-27s are
expected to constitute the bulk of attack aircraft at the disposal of the IAF.
Further, India is reported to be negotiating the purchase of a variation of the
MiG-29 (called the MiG-29 SMT), which has yet to be inducted into the Russian
air force.(23)
Indian Navy
The naval component of India's armed forces, as mentioned earlier, had not
played a significant part in the four armed conflicts of the past. The domestic
strategic community has been seeking to correct this imbalance and be prepared
to deliver a "three-way punch" in the event of another war. A review of Indian
naval build-up since the 1970s demonstrates that the navy has been engaged in
serious "perspective planning" since it has had the luxury of not being expected
to play a critical role in any armed conflict in the short run.
Indeed, of the three services, it is the Indian navy that has been most
successful in pursuing developmental targets, by enhancing its strike power,
maritime surveillance, and sealift capabilities. It has been particularly
successful in indigenous efforts at modifying and upgrading diverse imported
hardware and technology to suit domestic needs. This is of crucial significance
to the defense community because experts have increasingly concluded that the
future of deterrence is likely to be sea-based. In other words, a country's
ability to conduct warfare, whether employing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
or advanced conventional weapons, would be greatly augmented if its navy is able
to successfully execute these missions.
It is in this context that one should perceive Indian naval build-up and
Russia's collaboration in it. India has ordered two kilo-class submarines from
Russia, and negotiations are under way to purchase Krivak III frigates as well.
The navy will require $75 million for medium-term refits of the kilo-class
submarines, with the work to be done in St. Petersburg, Russia. In addition, it
needs another $50 million to upgrade four Foxtrot class submarines that it
purchased from Russia.
The navy is finalizing negotiations with Russia for the purchase of six
Ilyushin-78 planes, beginning with the delivery of two.(24) Two or three of
these planes are expected to provide air-to-air refueling facilities for the
front-line aircraft, including the LCA.(25) The remainder are expected to
provide the platform for an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) by
mounting a rotordome on the Ilyushins, and the on-board radar, with 360-degree
coverage, to provide on-site intelligence. The radar has been indigenously
produced, and the problem surrounding its miniaturization is expected to be
resolved soon with active Israeli help. The rotordome has undergone successful
experimental testing on the Avro aircraft and soon will be mounted atop the
11-78s. Providing refueling or serving as AWACS platform are mutually exclusive
functions given the space constraints on board the craft. Acquisition of the
Ilyushins and induction into their respective roles will tremendously enhance
Indian capability to conduct both intrusive surveillance and deep strikes of
strategic Pakistani territory. By almost any estimate, recent naval purchases
are to be regarded as major force multipliers.
From the navy's long "wish-list" from Russia, another item of special
significance is the Admiral Gorshkov. Built in 1984 and decommissioned in 1995,
this aircraft carder is being overhauled for the Indian navy, and there have
been reports that a modification of the MiG-29, called the MiG-29 SMT, has been
tested for operating off the Gorshkov.(26) India is also reported to be
negotiating the purchase of the Russian KamovV (aka Black Shark). This is a
highly sophisticated antisubmarine, or submarine-hunting device that sends out
deep sonar to accurately determine the location of an enemy submarine and
eliminate it. There are unconfirmed reports that Russia is assisting Indian
scientists in improving the accuracy of the underwater stage of the launch of
its submarine-launched ballistic missile Sagarika.(27) These two would
significantly upgrade Indian naval capacity to safeguard its territorial waters
and patrol the region beyond.
Indian Army
As part of their military technical cooperation, India and Russia in 1996
formalized the Joint Indo-Russian Working Group (JIRWOG). This group seeks to
organize bilateral defense cooperation along three levels: (a) It meets every
six months to one year and is mandated to take care of older or existing
servicing contracts for all three services; (b) the Military Technical Group
meets at the joint secretary level to chart future areas of cooperation; (c)
service-to-service contacts formalized during the visit of Russia's defense
minister, General Rodionov, aim to clarify many operational aspects of
service-to-service cooperation; it also involves exchange of officers, sharing
information concerning military exercises, and so forth.
The Indian army is negotiating the purchase of 155 mm self-propelled guns (SPGs).
Because Russia currently produces ammunition for the 152 guns, it wants India to
pay for the R&D to develop ammunition for the 155 mm guns before commercial
production becomes possible. India, in turn, insists that in a buyer's market,
it should not be expected to pay extra above the actual cost of the ammunition
that it will purchase.
The Indian army intends to mount the 155 mm guns on the chassis of the T-72
tanks that are being produced at Avadi in the southern Indian state of Tamil
Nadu. However, the user trials of these tanks have not been very successful so
far.(28) Negotiations are also on for the purchase of Russia's newest T-90C
tanks.(29) The advantage of the 155 mm SPGs are that they provide illumination
(perhaps some of the shells will be used as tracers to light the sky and help
pinpoint enemy locations) and augment night-fighting capability; they provide
more effective ammunition (over the 152mm variety); and they are usable with the
Bofors, the much-publicized Swedish guns in the inventory.
Because the army is not certain whether or when the 155 mm SPG deal will be
finalized, it is negotiating outright ("off-the-shelf") purchase of Russian-made
Msta guns. This may assume added importance because of related developments. If
the indigenous Arjun (main battle tank) does not enter into serial production
and service soon, the army will need these guns to augment its fire power; and
if Ukraine insists on supplying T-80 tanks to Pakistan, overruling Russian
objections,(30) the Indian army might need to counteract the resultant power
asymmetry.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHERN ASIA
Impact on the Indo-Pakistan Balance
The last full-blown military conflict between India and Pakistan, in 1971-72,
led to the creation of Bangladesh. The ensuing period has been described
variously as one of "ugly stability"(31) or "recessed deterrence,"(32) among
other characterizations, and has seen the rise in substate level,
insurrectionary warfare with sustained materiel and diplomatic support from
across the border to militant nationals. Since the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan in 1979, the insurgents include a vast number of Afghan refugees who
have been easy targets for Pakistani mobilization and recruitment. Countering
this threat presents a serious dilemma for India. Neglecting the issue would
create dangerous instability in the troubled region of Kashmir. Overt response
through armed means has the danger of escalating to the level of all-out
conflict, with the threat of use of nuclear weapons.(33)
The Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 removed any ambiguity surrounding its
nuclear weapons capability. Until the tests, the nuclear situation in South Asia
could be described as one of "existential deterrence."(34) In this situation,
since neither side has overtly deployed its nuclear arsenal, neither side is
able to incontrovertibly infer that it would be able to launch a preemptive
first-strike that would effectively neutralize the nuclear weapons capability of
the adversary. The residual capacity of the adversary could enable it to mount a
retaliatory second strike. This uncertainty creates some restraint on permitting
conflicts to escalate to a point where threat of use of nuclear weapons becomes
a possibility.
However, until India and Pakistan enunciate their respective nuclear doctrines
and institute robust C31 networks, the ambiguity surrounding the
tactical-military aspects of their nuclear relationship will endure. The recent
Indian force buildup should be perceived as an attempt to decisively alter the
force balance with Pakistan on the conventional weapons axis. It is aimed at
circumventing the strategic dilemma faced by the Indian security establishment
and developing a strategic doctrine and the necessary force level to enable
India to preempt a Pakistani attack and put a determined end to the
insurrectionary threat to the territorial integrity of the nation.
The doctrinal and tactical lessons learned from India's biggest-ever battle
exercise, Operation Brass Tacks (1986), are of particular relevance in this
context. General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, who was in command of Operation Brass
Tacks, laid out the strategic prerequisites for executing such a mission (in his
famous plan, Army 2000).(35) Sundarji's plan envisaged building a Rapid
Deployment Force, equipping the army with squadrons of attack helicopters and
light transport helicopters to quickly navigate difficult terrain and paradrop
forces and light fighting equipment into the enemy's own territory. Since this
plan has been only partially implemented (with one existing squadron being
supplied with attack helicopters), such offensive capability remains highly
limited.
It is in this context that India's purchase of Ilyushin-78 aircraft, the
Su-30MK, and the MiG-29 assumes particular significance. Further, India is
either indigenously developing or acquiring a host of night-fighting equipment,
as well as augmenting its electronic warfare and "fly-by-wire" capabilities. It
is estimated that such buildup would provide India a decisive qualitative, as
well as quantitative, edge over Pakistan in conventional warfare.
Given the experience of the three prior wars, and the (immutable) geostrategic
"compulsions" of Pakistan, India can acquire a military capability and force
posture (including deployment) that effectively neutralizes Pakistan's ability
to launch a first strike.(36) It is important to note, however, that in recent
years we have witnessed a series of initiatives to seek a diplomatic solution to
the protracted issues. These have included bilateral confidence-building
measures, cooperation under the auspices of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, and various nongovernmental ("track 2") initiatives, such
as the annual series of discussions at Neemrana (Rajasthan, India). Regardless
of the trajectory traversed by the cooperative initiatives, it is clear that
defense cooperation with Russia greatly augments Indian capacity to contain the
threat emanating from its western border.
Impact on the Sino-Indian balance
China's economic reforms, begun in the early 1970s, have made the country a
major player in the global economic arena. As a nuclear weapon state, it faces
altogether different challenges than India in augmenting its weapons of mass
destruction. In the current decade, however, as China pursues its great power
aspirations, it has entered into a series of diplomatic/military agreements that
seek to deemphasize conflict and promote peaceful coexistence in its strategic
neighborhood.
However, experts remain ambivalent regarding Chinese behavior in the medium to
long term. The benign projection of Chinese policy makes it likely that the
country will increase its stake in the international system. On the other hand,
it is also possible that as China improves its relative position in the
international balance of power, the "realist" strand of its strategic culture
might resurface, threatening the strategic stability of Asia and beyond.(37)
On the Sino-Indian front, mixed indicators abound. Eight rounds of meetings of
the IndoChinese Joint Group have led to a significant reduction of troop levels
and their deployment pattern along the line of actual control. On the other
hand, Tibet remains an intractable problem. In recent years, China has deployed
additional troops and surveillance units along the sensitive forward posts in
Tibet. In the months leading up to the nuclear tests, India claimed that China
was lengthening the runways at military airstrips in Tibet to permit tactical
strikes by attack aircraft. Further, China was alleged to have beefed up
surveillance along the Coco Islands, barely twenty-five miles off the strategic
Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
While some of this can be discounted as Indian posturing, it remains clear that
an uneasy rapprochement best characterizes the Sino-Indian relationship. A major
strain appeared during the recent visit of President Clinton to China, when a
joint communique issued by the two sides espoused an active Chinese role in
resolving the South Asian nuclear crisis. This was clearly unacceptable to
India, which faces a nuclear and missile threat from China as well as from its
clandestine assistance to Pakistan. A defining element of the Indian strategic
dilemma is how to alert the West to its growing threat from China while also
seeking a rapprochement with the latter.(38)
Following the end of the cold war, both Russia and the United States have
significantly reduced their naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Concerned by the
growing Chinese naval buildup, several states of Southeast Asia have urged India
to increase its presence and counteract the naval power asymmetry, which could
have serious implications for trade and other maritime operations. For India,
this complements its recent Ostpolitik ("Look East" policy) wherein it pursues
its economic and geopolitical aspirations through several avenues, including
membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations, technology sharing
with member states, and limited naval exercises with Singapore, Malaysia, and
the Philippines.(39) These interactions, which have important implications for
the Sino-Indian relationship in the next century, deepen Indian commitment on
its southeastern flank.
Analysts concur that at least in the medium term, neither India nor China has
tactical or strategic objectives that would make them adversaries. Rapid
economic growth is an imperative for both sides, and the two are indeed
deepening and widening their economic cooperation (including in space launch
technology). Nevertheless, both sides augment their ability to make war against
a possible downturn in their relationship.
In this context, it is significant that Russia has entered into military
technical cooperation with both India and China. Given its security concerns and
developmental imperatives, it makes sense for Russia to forge strong links with
both India and China. For India, too, pursuing a policy of greater convergence
with Russia and improved relations with China appears to be the most suitable
course of action. A serious deterioration in Sino-Indian relationship would
compel Russia to choose China over India as its strategic partner.(40) Further,
China will be a central figure in any realistic configuration of the emerging
Asian balance of power. Accordingly, India and China should initiate
negotiations to clarify their mutual concerns and priorities relating to their
strategic neighborhood. Clarification of doctrines and force structures would
enhance transparency and accountability in their bilateral relations and
diminish security concerns of other, smaller, states in the region. Such a move,
particularly from the Indian side, would clarify whether its deepening defense
cooperation with Russia is geared toward meeting contingent security threats or
augmenting its power projection capability.
In the post-cold war era choices of policy instruments to pursue national goals
and interests have been in flux. The preceding discussion has highlighted the
national contingent reasons that propel Russia and India to seek closer
bilateral ties. After the initial phase of adjustments with which both sides had
to contend, within their borders and beyond, a deeper relationship of strategic
significance is in the making. This makes it doubly imperative for India to
clarify the doctrinal and operational aspects of its developmental goals and
priorities. Doing so would enable the international community to better
appreciate India's legitimate security concerns and policies, and not perceive
them as spasmodic acts of a state that still searches for its rightful place in
the global community.
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